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INTRODUCTION
In the political and legal debate over same-sex marriage, references to
the rights (or benefits or privileges) and responsibilities (or burdens or
obligations) associated with marriage constitute a key weapon in the
rhetorical battle.' Most of the focus, however, has been on the "rights"
side, particularly the 1,1382 federal and countless additional state rights
associated with marriage. A pair of recent newspaper headlines, however,
got me thinking about the responsibilities side of the ledger, specifically,
that of fidelity to one's spouse. 3
0 In the last century, the color lavender has come to be associated with homosexuality.
However, given the somewhat Victorian slant of the subject matter of this Article, it might
alternatively be titled The Green Letter, green being the color associated with homosexuality in
Victorian England. See DIDIER ERIBoN, DICTIONNAIRE DES CULTURES GAYS ETLESBIENNEs 317,488
(2003); WAYNE DYNES, HOMOLEXIS: A HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL LEXICON OF HOMOSEXUALITY 33
(1985); WILLIAM STEWART, CASSELL'S QUEER COMPANION: A DICTIONARY OF GAY LIFE AND
CULTURE 107, 143 (1995).
o With apologies to NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).
* Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. I
wish to thank Gabe Verdugo and Trinie Thai-Parker for their valuable research assistance, as well
as Professors Helen Anderson, Karen Boxx, Mary Fan, Jim Hardisty, Maureen Howard, Mike
Townsend, and Kathryn Watts for their valuable input.
1. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006).
2. See Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to
Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Jan. 31, 1997),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf; Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23,
2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 418 (Cal. 2008); Guillory v. Guillory, 7 So.
3d 144, 147 (La. 2009). In some ways, of course, the divide between rights and responsibilities is an
illusory one, particularly in this context, for the flip side of the responsibility to be faithful to one's
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The first headline was about a bill introduced in New Hampshire to
repeal its 200-year-old law defining adultery as a criminal offense.4 The
second was about a forthcoming study finding that a non-trivial percentage
of individuals in same-sex relationships have sex outside of those
relationships.5 These two headlines, coupled with the knowledge that New
Hampshire had recently become one of a handful of states in which same-
6
sex marriage was recognized, raised the following question in my mind: to
what extent do laws that provide criminal penalties or civil damages for
adultery or other torts related to marriage (or that otherwise make acts of
adultery a relevant consideration, such as fault-based divorce) apply to
same-sex couples who enter into a marriage or its functional equivalent,
such as a civil union or a domestic partnership?
As I began to explore the issue, starting with case law in New
Hampshire, I came across a recent case from the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in which the court held that a husband-whose wife had sexual
relations with another woman-was unable to obtain a fault-based divorce
from his wife on the ground of adultery.7 The court-relying in part on
cases interpreting the state's criminal adultery statute and in part relying on
a dictionary-held that the term adultery refers to coital sexual intercourse,
which requires the insertion of a penis into a vagina, between a married
person and someone other than his or her spouse. Since that definition
necessarily requires the involvement of a man and a woman, the court
concluded that same-sex sexual conduct could never constitute "adultery"
as that term is used in either the divorce laws or the criminal adultery
statute.9 Indeed, so narrow was the court's definition of adultery that non-
coital sexual conduct between two people of the opposite sex, such as oral
sex, likewise did not count as adultery 0 (a holding that no doubt clashes
with what most married people would view as adultery)."
spouse is the right to have your spouse remain faithful to you.
4. Evan Buxbaum & Edmund DeMarche, New Hampshire Eyes Repealing Law on Adultery,
CNN.com, Jan. 13,2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/01/12/adultery.vote/index.html. Prior
attempts to repeal the law have failed by narrow margins. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for
Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45, 49 (1991-1992). The bill introduced
in 2010 likewise was not ultimately enacted into law.
5. See Scott James, Many Successful Gay Marriages Share an Open Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2010, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/29sfietro.html.
6. See H.B. 73, 2009 Gen. Ct., 161st Sess. (N.H. 2009).
7. In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1010-12 (N.H. 2003).
8. Id. at 1011.
9. Id. at 1012.
10. Bethany Catron, Case Note, If You Don't Think This is Adultery, Go Ask Your Spouse:
The New Hampshire Supreme Court's Faulty Interpretation ofAdultery in In Re Blanchflower, 834
A.2d 1010 (2003)-Groundsfor a Fault Based Divorce, 30 U. DAYTON L. REv. 339, 346 (2005).
11. See Laura W. Morgan, What Constitutes Adultery?, FAM. L. CONSULTING, Dec. 2003,
http://www.famlawconsult.com/archive/reader200312.html ("No married person thinks that his or
her spouse is adhering to the marriage vows when he or she engages in intimate sexual acts such as
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Although the case did not involve a married same-sex couple, the
implication of the decision for married same-sex couples in New
Hampshire is clear: their sexual relations with those other than their spouse
do not count as adultery (unless they happen to have a sexual affair with
someone of the opposite sex that includes vaginal intercourse). Nor did the
New Hampshire decision turn out to be an isolated one. Decisions from
several other jurisdictions confronted with the issue (mostly in the divorce
context) likewise held that same-sex sexual activity does not constitute
adultery.12 In contrast, decisions from numerous other jurisdictions point in
the opposite direction, holding that same-sex extramarital sexual relations
constitute adultery.' 3
In this Article, I explore the division in the courts over the question of
whether same-sex sexual conduct constitutes adultery in four contexts:
(1) criminal adultery prosecutions, (2) fault-based divorce actions, (3) civil
tort actions for interference with the marital relationship, and (4) murder
cases raising a provocation defense based on a spouse's act of adultery.
In so doing, I arrive at the following conclusions. First, as illustrated in
Part I, there is a significant overlap between states that recognize same-sex
marriage and states where adulterous conduct is legally relevant, making
this more than an interesting theoretical exercise. Second, Part II shows
that those decisions holding that same-sex conduct does not constitute
adultery do so on the basis of outdated precedents that rely on a gendered
concept of adultery that treats sexual dalliances by men and women
differently, as well as on heteronormative statutory regimes in which same-
sex adultery and opposite-sex adultery were punished differently because
all sexual activity between individuals of the same sex was considered
unlawful. Third, Part Ell demonstrates that the policy arguments in favor of
maintaining any of these bases for criminal and civil liability (and there are
certainly valid arguments against their maintenance) apply with equal force
to same-sex couples and same-sex conduct as they do to heterosexual
couples and conduct. And fourth, the same equality principles that have
resulted in the extension of the right to marry to same sex-couples likewise
require the application of adultery laws and related doctrines to same-sex
couples and same-sex conduct. Indeed, a failure to apply them in those
contexts devalues same-sex relationships and perpetuates antiquated,
oral or anal sex with another person.").
12. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 180 Ill. App. 578, 578 (App. Ct. 1913); H. v. H., 157 A.2d
721, 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); W. v. W., 226 A.2d 860, 861-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1967); Cohen v. Cohen, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427-28 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 2 Ohio N.P. 342, 342 (C.P. 1895); Glaze v. Glaze, 46 Va. Cir. 333, 334 (Cir. Ct.
1998).
13. See, e.g., Patin v. Patin, 371 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Owens v. Owens, 274
S.E.2d 484,485-86 (Ga. 1981); Menge v. Menge, 491 So. 2d 700, 702 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Dunn
v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 705 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 & n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999); RGM v.
DEM, 410 S.E.2d 564, 567 (S.C. 1991).
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negative stereotypes about gay people, as argued in Part IV. As ironic as it
seems, despite decades of litigation to get the government out of the
bedrooms of gays and lesbians, this Article concludes that principles of
equality on the bases of gender and sexual orientation require that the
private sexual conduct of gays and lesbians be intruded upon to the same
extent as their heterosexual counterparts.
I. THE LEGAL RELEVANCE OF ADULTERY TODAY
Just as at one point in time every state in the United States had a law
criminalizing sodomy,14 so too at one time did virtually every state in the
United States have a law criminalizing adultery.15 And while many states
repealed their laws criminalizing sodomy and adultery in the latter half of
the 20th Century, today twenty-four states and territories still have statutes
on the books making it a crime to commit adultery,16 significantly more
than the thirteen states still criminalizing sodomy at the time the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its decision Lawrence v. Texas striking down
Texas's sodomy law as applied to private, consensual sex between two
people of the same sex.' 8
Moreover, while one might be tempted-based on Justice Antonin
Scalia's apocalyptic warning in his Lawrence dissent19 c-to onclude that
the decision spelled the death knell for adultery laws, courts have, with
virtual unanimity, upheld adultery laws' constitutionality post-Lawrence.20
14. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986).
15. See Geoffrey May, Experiments in the Legal Control of Sex Expression, 39 YALE L.J.
219, 219 (1929); Marvin M. Moore, The Diverse Definitions ofCriminalAdultery, 30 U. KAN. CITY
L. REV. 219, 222 & n.20 (1962).
16. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2010); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-6-501 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2010); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3507 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14
(West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.29 to -.30 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36
(West 2010); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (2010); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-09 (2010); OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2010); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit., 33, § 4147
(2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 to -70 (2009); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-103 (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-365 (2010); Wis. STAT.ANN. § 944.16
(West 2009).
17. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
18. Id. at 578-79.
19. See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. See Beecham v. Henderson Cnty., Tenn., 422 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2005) (expressing
doubt that its earlier decision upholding the constitutionality of adultery statutes against a due
process challenge was altered by Lawrence); Lowe v. Swanson, 639 F. Supp. 2d 857, 871 (N.D.
Ohio 2009); U.S. v. Brown, No. 200201647, 2005 WL 2381094, at *3-4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Sept. 14, 2005); U.S. v. Orellana, 62 M.J. 595, 598 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (relying both on
the fact that in the military context, adultery is harmful to good order and discipline but noting also
that it preserves marriages). But see Thong v. Andre Chreky Salon, 634 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46-47
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In addition, as Professor Mary Ann Case has persuasively argued, the
Lawrence majority's statement that, as a general rule, states cannot regulate
private sexual behavior "absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution
the law protects" 21 leaves ample room for states to criminalize adultery:
Contra to the way many others have read the text, I do not
take the Lawrence majority's reference to the continuing
potential legitimacy of the State's authority "to define the
meaning of the relationship or [to set] its boundaries" if there
would otherwise be "abuse of an institution the law protects"
to be intended to address the problem of same-sex marriage.
Like so much of the rest of the majority's prose, this passage
is admittedly obscure, but my best guess is that the reference
is instead to something akin to the likely continuing validity
of laws prohibiting bigamy and adultery, which can be seen as
abuse of the institution of legal marriage even when
extraordinary circumstances such as spousal consent allow the
acts to take place "absent injury to a person." 22
Indeed, post-Lawrence, even sodomy laws can be and still are enforced,
so long as they are not enforced in settings that involve the sort of private
consensual conduct at issue in Lawrence itself. After all, the Lawrence
court was careful to distinguish the case before it from other situations:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated
in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.23
Thus, post-Lawrence, courts have relied on this language in Lawrence
to uphold the application of sodomy laws in cases involving soliciting
sodomy in public,24 engaging in sodomy with minors,25 and to acts of
(D.D.C. 2009) (suggesting that the logic of Lawrence, as interpreted in a case striking down
Virginia fornication statute, might apply to adultery statutes, reasoning that both involve .'private
sexual conduct between two consenting adults"' (quoting Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371
(Va. 2005))).
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (majority opinion).
22. Mary Anne Case, Of "This " and "That " in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REv. 75,
140-41 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
24. See State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1237 (La. 2005); Singson v. Commonwealth, 621
S.E.2d 682, 685-88 (Va. 2005).
25. See, e.g., U.S. v. Banker, 63 M.J. 657, 659-61 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006); In re R.L.C.,
643 S.E.2d 920,925 (N.C. 2007); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918,924 (Va. 2007).
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Nor are adultery statutes as 'dead-letter'27 as they are sometimes
thought to be. In the military today, prosecutions for adultery are relatively
28
frequent. And as recently as 2010, officials in New York arrested and
indicted a woman on charges of adultery.29 Indeed, courts view the risk of
criminal prosecution for adultery as sufficient to justify upholding the
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination when a witness is
asked about adulterous conduct in a civil action.30
Moreover, setting to one side criminal prosecutions for adultery, there
are numerous other ways in which the law deems adulterous conduct to be
legally relevant. First despite the fact that today all states offer some form
of no-fault divorce,3 thirty-four jurisdictions still provide the option of
seeking a fault-based legal separation or divorce.32 Moreover, some states
and territories use adultery as a factor in determining spousal support33 or
26. See U.S. v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 200, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
27. Siegel, supra note 4, at 49 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (1980)).
28. Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 548 F.3d 1264, 1280 & n.35 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).
29. See Eamon McNiff, Woman Charged with Adultery to Challenge New York Law, ABC
NEWS, June 8, 2010, http://abcnews.go.comlTheLaw/woman-charged-adultery-challenge-york-
law/story?id=10857437; Michael Sheridan, Woman CaughtHaing Se inPar* ChwgedwithAdultery-in
New York, N.Y. DAuYNEws, June 8,2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/20l0/06/08/2010-06-
08_upstate woman chargedwitadultery_aer lewd__act_iLa_public parklhtent
30. See, e.g., Correia v. Correia, 877 N.E.2d 629,634 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); S.K. v. I.,
No. 203247-2008, 2010 WL 1371943, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2010).
31. See generally Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 417, 439-40 (1992) (surveying the different types of no-fault divorces amongst the states).
32. See ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(a)(2) (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050(2) (2010); Aluz. REV.
STAT ANN. §§ 25-903(1), 904(1) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-808(a)(1), (b)(1), 9-12-
301(b)(4) (2010); CONN. STAT. § 46b-40(c)(3) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1503(6),
1505(b)(2) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3(6) (2010); 19 GuAM CODE ANN. § 8203(a) (2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-603(1) (2010); 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/401(a)(1) (West 2010); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(A)(1) (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103(2) (2010); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 902(1)(A) (2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103(a)(1) (2010); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § I (West 2010); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 (2010); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.320(2)(1)(a) (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7(11) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:34-2(a) (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1(C) (West 2010); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW
§§ 170(4), 200(4) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7(6) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-
03(1) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.01(C), 3105.17(A)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 101 (West 2010); 23 PENN. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(2) (West 2010); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 321(1) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-2(2) (2010); S.C. CODEANN. § 20-3-
10(1) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-2(1) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101(a)(3) (2010);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 15, § 551(1) (2010); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-91(A)(1) (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-204 (LexisNexis 2010).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1(b) (2010); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-130(A) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E) (2010); W.V. CODE ANN. § 48-8-104
(LexisNexis 2010).
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properl division34 upon divorce, as a basis for denying inheritance
3 36
rights, or as a basis for deeming someone unfit as an adoptive parent.
In addition, a handful of states permit a person whose spouse commits
adultery to bring a tort action for "criminal conversation" aainst the third
person with whom his or her spouse committed adultery.3
Furthermore, a recognized "heat of passion" defense to a charge of
murdering one's spouse or paramour-which will typically reduce the
crime to voluntary manslaughter-is either finding them in the act of
adultery, recently being informed of their act of adultery, or in some
jurisdictions, having reason to believe that they committed adultery.38
Finally, there are other, unusual ways that a handful of laws take
adulterous conduct into account. Allowing adultery to occur in your
massage parlor will result in the loss of your massage parlor license in
Alabama"9 while hiring an adulterer to serve liquor will cause a bar in
Kansas to forfeit its liquor license.40
Given the common Puritanical roots of both adultery laws and laws
criminalizing homosexual conduct,41 it is perhaps not surprising that most
of the nearly two dozen states with laws criminalizing adultery neither
permit nor recognize same-sex marriages, civil unions, or domestic
partnerships. On the flip side, many of the states that provide for legal
recognition of same-sex relationships no longer have adultery laws on the
books.
Yet, there remain a handful of states, mostly in the northeast United
States, that both provide legal recognition of same-sex relationships and
that criminalize adulte 7 . Two states that permit same-sex couples to
marry-MassachusettS4 and New Hampshire43-criminalize adultery.44
34. See 19 GuAM CODE ANN. § 8411(a) (2010).
35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 744 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-14 (West 2010); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090(2) (West 2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 2010); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3B:28-15, 3A:37-2 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-I(a)(2) (2010); Ofoo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2103.05 (LexisNexis 2010); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 2261(5) (2007).
36. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(j) (West 2010).
37. Caroline L. Batchelor, Comment, Falling Out of Love with an Outdated Tort: An
Argument for the Abolition of Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1910,
1915 n.35 (2009) (identifying Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Utah as states that continue to recognize the tort).
38. See 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 165 (15th ed. 1994). See
generally Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 197 (2005) (discussing competing rationales for the provocation defense).
39. ALA. CODE §§ 45-2-40.10, -13-41(k) (2010).
40. KAN. STAT. ANN. § § 41-2601(n), -2610(b) (2010).
41. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv.
631, 647.
42. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
43. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010).
44. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2010); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (2010).
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Another three states that, while not permitting same-sex couples to marry,
may or do recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state-New
York,45 Rhode Island,46 and Maryland4 -likewise criminalize adultery.48
Moreover, four states that permit same-sex couples to marry-
Connecticut,49 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont5 -recognize
adultery as a ground for divorce.s1 In addition, New Jersey, which permits
same-sex couples to enter into civil unions, 52 recognizes adultery as a
ground for seeking dissolution of a civil union.53 Plus, the three states that
may or do recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state-New
York, Rhode Island, and Maryland-likewise recognize adultery as a
ground for divorce. A fourth state, New Mexico, which has no statute or
constitutional amendment explicitly refusing to recognize out-of-state
same-sex marriages,55 likewise recognizes adultery as a ground ford*56divorce.
Furthermore, the "heat of passion" defense to a charge of homicide
based on the discovery that one's spouse has committed adultery is
recognized in some form in virtually everjurisdiction in the United States
that permits same-sex couples to marry, as well as in nearly all of the
Indeed, Massachusetts has a second, most unusual law on the books that provides that persons
divorced from one another who thereafter cohabitate as husband and wife or live together in the
same house are guilty of adultery! See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 40 (West 2010).
45. Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008).
46. Letter from Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney Gen., R.I., to Jack R. Warner, Comm'r, R. I. Bd.
of Governors for Higher Educ. (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.domawatch.org/cases/
rhodeisland/chambersvormiston/RI_AG _Opinion onSSM.pdf. A subsequent Rhode Island
Supreme Court case cast doubt on at least a portion of the attorney general's opinion. See Chambers
v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007). But see id. at 967-68 (Suttell, J., dissenting) (noting
that the majority's opinion addressed only a narrow issue).
47. 95 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (2010).
48. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (West 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17
(McKinney 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2010).
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20(4) (West 2010).
50. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010).
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-40(c) (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1
(West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7(11) (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(1) (2010).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-30 (West 2010).
53. Id. § 2A:34-2.1(a).
54. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103(a)(1) (West 2010); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 170(4),
200(4) (McKinney 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-2(2) (2010). However, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has ruled that its family courts lack jurisdiction to grant divorces to married out-of-state
couples. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007).
55. See 95 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (2010).
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1(C) (West 2010).
57. See, e.g., State v. Saxon, 86 A. 590, 594 (Conn. 1913); Nicholson v. U.S., 368 A.2d 561,
565 (D.C. 1977) (dictum); State v. Thomas, 151 N.W. 842, 843 (Iowa 1915); Commonwealth v.
Bermudez, 348 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Mass. 1976); State v. Smith, 455 A.2d 1041, 1043 (N.H. 1983).
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58
states that may or do recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages.
Thus, because adultery remains legally relevant throughout the United
States generally, and in states that recognize same-sex marriages
specifically, the question of whether the law of adultery applies to married
same-sex couples and same-sex extramarital sexual relations of opposite-
sex couples is not only a theoretically interesting problem, but is also a
practical one.
II. THE EARLY LAW OF ADULTERY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
To understand the modem legal dispute over whether same-sex conduct
constitutes adultery, it is necessary to examine the historical development
of proscriptions on and punishment for adulterous conduct.
The first laws to proscribe and punish adultery were Biblical laws.59
Moses, in the Ten Commandments, a proscribed adultery.61 The Biblical
punishment for adultery-like that for sodomy 2-was death, for both the
adulterer and the adulteress. 63 The Biblical definition of adultery was
gendered in nature, focusing solely on the question whether the female was
married, with the marital status of the male being irrelevant." Thus, for
example, the Book of Deuteronomy describes adultery as a situation in
which a "man be found lying with a woman married to an husband." 65
Similarly, the Book ofLeviticus refers to a "man that committeth adultery
with another man's wife." 66 This is not to say that Biblical law condoned
58. See, e.g., Bartram v. State, 364 A.2d 1119, 1153 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); People v.
Wood, 27 N.E. 362, 364-65 (N.Y. 1891); State v. Imundi, 121 A. 215, 217-18 (R.I. 1923).
59. Siegel, supra note 4, at 46 & n.7 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6, at 430 n.1 (1980);
Exodus 20:14 (King James); Leviticus 20:10 (King James); Deuteronomy 22:22 (King James)).
60. Exodus 20:2-17 (King James); Deuteronomy 5:6-21 (King James).
61. Exodus 20:14 (King James) ("Thou shalt not commit adultery."); Deuteronomy 5:18
(King James) ("Neither shalt thou commit adultery.").
62. Leviticus 20:13 (King James) ("If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be
upon them.").
63. Leviticus 20:10 (King James) ("And the man that committeth adultery with another man's
wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbour's wife, the adulterer and the adulteress
shall surely be put to death."); Deuteronomy 22:22 (King James) ("If a man be found lying with a
woman married to an husband, then they shall both of them die, both the man that lay with the
woman, and the woman: so shalt thou put away evil from Israel.").
64. See State v. Lash, 16 N.J.L. 380, 390 (1838) (citing Leviticus 20:10 (King James);
Deuteronomy 22:22-28 (King James)); S.B. v. S.J.B., 609 A.2d 124, 125 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1992) ("A biblical definition of 'Adultery' is 'the lying with a woman married to a husband'. The
penalty for this crime was death for both the adulterer and adulteress. Historically, there could only
be adultery if the woman was married. The marital status of the male was irrelevant." (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Deuteronomy 22:22 (King James) and citing Leviticus 20:10 (King
James))); Moore, supra note 15, at 222 (noting that there is not a single instance in the Bible in
which a man is said to have committed adultery with an unmarried woman (citing Lash, 16 N.J.L. at
384; Leviticus 20:10 (King James); Deuteronomy 22:22 (King James))).
65. Deuteronomy 22:22 (King James).
66. Leviticus 20:10 (King James).
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sexual activity between a man-married or not-and an unmarried woman,
but the punishment was far less severe: a fine of fifty shekels of silver, to
be paid to the woman's father.67
This gendered approach to defining adultery found its way into the
English common law. At common law in England, adultery was not, as a
general matter, treated as a crime unless it was "'open and notorious,' in
which case it was punished not as the independent crime of adultery but
instead under the more general rubric of "'public nuisance."' 68 But the
common law treated adultery as a private wrong for which a civil action
could be brought by the aggrieved husband.69
The meaning of adultery at English common law was clear and tracked
its definition under Biblical law: it encompassed only the situation in
which a married woman had sexual intercourse with a man-single or
married-who was not her husband.70 Thus, the marital status of the
woman was the key consideration and that of the man was irrelevant.7 ' As
under Biblical law, both the married woman and the man with whom she
had sexual intercourse were deemed to have committed adultery.72
Moreover, consistent with Biblical law, sexual intercourse between a
married man and an unmarried woman at English common law, while not
condoned, constituted the lesser offense of fornication73 (an offense that
also applied to sexual intercourse between an unmarried man and an
unmarried woman74). Fornication, like adultery, was generally not treated
as a crime (unless it was open and notorious, in which case it was
prosecuted under the more general rubric of "'public nuisance"' 75) but was
67. Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (King James) ("If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, which is
not betrothed, and lay hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found; Then the man that lay with
her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife; because he
hath humbled her, he may not put her away all his days."); see also Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 390
("[C]ertain it is, that this wide distinction between criminal intercourse with a married woman, and
a single woman, is emphatically settled in the Levitical law; the former being punished with death,
while the latter was only a fine"); S.B., 609 A.2d at 125 (citing Deuteronomy 22:29 (King James)).
68. See U.S. v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 147 n.l (C.M.A. 1986) (quoting 2 CHARLES E. ToRCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 214 (14th ed. 1979)); State v. Holland, 145 S.W. 522, 523 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1912); Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384; Siegel, supra note 4, at 47-48; 2 TORCIA, supra note 38, § 210.
69. Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384; State v. Bigelow, 92 A. 978, 978-79 (Vt. 1915); 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (4th ed. 1768).
70. Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384; Bigelow, 92 A. at 978-79; State v. Roberts, 173 N.W. 310, 311
(Wis. 1919); Moore, supra note 15, at 219.
71. See Evans v. Murff, 135 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1955); Holland, 145 S.W. at 523;
Franzetti v. Franzetti, 120 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); 2 TORCIA,supra note 38, § 213.
72. Hickson, 22 M.J. at 146-47; 2 TORCIA, supra note 38, § 213; Moore, supra note 15, at
219.
73. Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147; Roberts, 173 N.W. at 311; 2 TORCIA, supra note 38, § 213;
Moore, supra note 15, at 219.
74. 2 TORCIA, supra note 38, § 213; Moore, supra note 15, at 219.
75. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147 n.l (quoting 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW § 214 (14th ed. 1979)); Holland, 145 S.W. at 523; Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384; 2 TORCIA, supra
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instead a private wrong for which a civil action could be brought.76
Although one is tempted to conclude that the common law's gendered
approach to punishing extramarital sex was purely a form of male
privilege, the approach of the common law was at least arguably logically
consistent with what it viewed as the evil associated with extramarital sex:
its potential impact on inheritance and property rights. The common law
took the term "adultery" literally, applyinF it only to sexual acts that might
"adulterate" the bloodline of a family.7 By having extramarital sex, a
married woman risked becoming pregnant and giving birth to another
man's child, exposing her husband to the possibility of unwittingly
maintaining another man's children (referred to in the case law as
"spurious issue" or "spurious offspring") thinking them to be his own and
having them succeed to his inheritance, thus shifting his property away
from his own blood to strangers. 79 If, in contrast, a married man had sexual
intercourse with an unmarried woman, no comparable risk to property and
inheritance rights existed:8 0 there would be no risk that the married man's
wife would unwittingly think the child to be hers, and under the common
law, the illegitimate child of the unmarried woman had no right to inherit
from either the married man or his wife.
In contrast to the common law courts, the Church of England-through
its canon law as enforced by its ecclesiastical courts-took a very different
approach to defining adultery. The ecclesiastical courts, which, amon
other things, had the power to grant a divorce and to award alimony,
viewed the evil of extramarital sex to be not its impact on property and
inheritance rights but rather its breach of the marital vows and the
attendant unhappiness and demoralization that it caused.83
Given this focus, the canon law's definition of adultery broke from that
of the common law (and, ironically enough, that of Biblical law) in that it
was gender-neutral: a married person, male or female, was guilty of
adultery if he or she had sexual intercourse with a third person. 8 4 If the
note 38, § 210; Siegel, supra note 4, at 47-48.
76. Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384.
77. Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147.
78. See Evans v. Murff 135 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1955); Holland, 145 S.W. at 523;
Moore, supra note 15, at 220.
79. See Murf 135 F. Supp. at 911; Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147; Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384; State v.
Bigelow, 92 A. 978, 978 (Vt. 1915); State v. Roberts, 173 N.W. 310, 311 (Wis. 1919); Moore,
supra note 15, at 220; 2 TORCIA, supra note 38, § 210.
80. Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147.
81. See Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384.
82. See id. at 385, 389.
83. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 146-47; Holland, 145 S.W. at 523; Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 385;
Bigelow, 92 A. at 979; Moore, supra note 15, at 221; 2 ToRCIA, supra note 38, § 210.
84. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 146-47 (citing ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 377 (2d ed.
1969)); Holland, 145 S.W. at 523; Lash, 16 N.J.L. at 384; Moore, supra note 15, at 221; 2 TRCA,
supra note 38, § 210.
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third person was also married, he or she was guilty of adultery, but if the
third person was single, he or she was guilty only of fornication8 s (the
rationale being that the latter did not break a marriage vow, the focus of the1)86
canon law).
When the Puritans imported England's prohibitions on adultery into the
American colonies, they broke from England by choosing to make it a
criminal offense-and a capital one at that. 87 During this period, some
colonies adopted the common law definition of adultery, others the
ecclesiastical definition, and still others a hybrid of the two, a divide that
persists today across the states.8 8
Thus, in those U.S. jurisdictions that follow the common law, adultery
is defined as sexual intercourse between a married woman and a man not
her husband (whether married or not), with both deemed guilty of adultery;
sexual intercourse between a married man and an unmarried woman is not
adultery.89 In contrast, those jurisdictions that follow the canon law provide
that a married person, male or female, is guilty of adultery if he or she has
sexual intercourse with someone other than his or her spouse; if the third
person with whom he or she had sexual intercourse is unmarried, that third
person is only guilty of the offense of fornication.9 0 The hybrid
jurisdictions typically use the canon law's non-gendered definition of
adultery in which a married person, male or female, is guilty of the act if he
or she had sexual intercourse with someone other than his or her spouse
but track the common law in making the third person guilty of adultery
without regard to whether he or she is married or unmarried. 91
Of the twenty-four state and territorial adultery statutes in existence in
the United States today, only one codifies the common law approach 92
(perhaps in recognition of the problems that this gendered approach
presents under federal and state equal protection clauses and state equal
85. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147; Bigelow, 92 A. at 978-79; Moore, supra note 15, at 220; 2
TORCIA, supra note 38, § 213.
86. See Bigelow, 92 A. at 979.
87. Siegel, supra note 4, at 48 (citing Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the
State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 225-26 (1986)).
88. Moore, supra note 15, at 221, 223-26.
89. See id. at 223; 2 ToRCA, supra note 38, § 211.
90. See Moore, supra note 15, at 223; 2 TORCIA, supra note 38, § 211.
91. See Moore, supra note 15, at 224-25; 2 TORCIA supra note 38, § 211. Some jurisdictions
have followed yet another hybrid model, in which the third person, if unmarried, is guilty of
adultery if that person is a man but not if it is a woman. See Moore, supra note 15, at 225. Most of
these have been revised to be gender neutral. See, e.g., Anti-Gender Discriminatory Language
Criminal Offenses Amendment Act, 1994 D.C. Legis. Serv. 10-119, Act 10-209, § 2(d) (West)
(amending D.C. Code § 22-301 to make it gender neutral); Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F.
Supp. 1465, 1476 (D. Utah 1995) (recounting history).
92. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West 2010).
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rights amendments),93 five codify the canon law approach,94 fifteen codi '
the hybrid approach, 5 and two criminalize adultery without defining it.
In some instances, the statutes criminalizing adultery provide a detailed
definition, making it easy to determine whether they follow the common
law definition, the canon law definition, or some hybrid of the two. Thus,
for example, Minnesota law currently provides an explicit, common law
definition of the crime of adultery: "When a married woman has sexual
intercourse with a man other than her husband, whether married or not,
both are guilty of adultery. . . ."97
Similarly, Utah law provides an explicit, canonical definition of
adultery: "A married person commits adultery when he voluntarily has
sexual intercourse with a person other than his spouse[," 98and "[a]ny
unmarried person who shall voluntarily engage in sexual intercourse with
another is guilty of fornication." 99 And New York law is demonstrative of
an explicit, hybrid definition of adultery: "A person is guilty of adultery
when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when
he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse." 00
Yet, in some states, lawmakers simply made it a crime to commit
"adultery" without defining the term, leaving it to the courts to interpret its
meaning. 0 1 Maryland law is demonstrative, providing simply that "a
person may not commit adultery" without defining the term anywhere.
When confronted with statutes such as these, courts have been forced to
decide the question of whether the statute incorporated the common law
definition of adultery, the canon law definition, or some combination of the
two. In the context of criminal adultery statutes, the questions that arise are
93. See Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674, 676-77 (Fla. 1979); Barbara A. Brown et al., The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871,
961-62 (1971); Mark Strasser, Sex, Law, and the Sacred Precincts of the Marital Bedroom: On
State and Federal Right to Privacy Jurisprudence, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 753,
779 (2000).
94. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2010); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-09 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365
(2010).
95. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2010); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2010); FLA. STAT.
§ 798.01 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West
2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West
2010); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2010); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2010); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4147 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-6-2 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 to -70 (2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 2009).
In addition, Michigan appears to codify the variant of the hybrid approach in which the third person
is guilty of adultery if they are an unmarried man but not if they are an unmarried woman. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.29 to -.30 (West 2010).
96. MD. CODE ANN., CRM. LAW § 10-501 (West 2010); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1 (2010).
97. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36(1) (West 2010).
98. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103(1) (West 2010).
99. Id. § 76-7-104(1).
100. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2010).
101. See Moore, supra note 15, at 222.
102. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501(a) (West 2010).
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two-fold: (1) does adultery require the involvement of a married woman;
and (2) if the third person is unmarried, is his or her conduct considered
adultery or merely fornication? In the context of divorce statutes, the
question is whether the wife is entitled to a divorce if her husband has
sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman. This, in turn, requires courts
to consider two threshold matters: the appropriateness of using canon law
as an interpretive tool and the question as to whether the term "adultery"
necessarily means the same thing in all contexts.
Although it is not unusual to rely on England's common law when
interpreting U.S. law, it is somewhat unorthodox to rely on canon law.
Thus, when confronted with an ambiguous adultery statute and a choice
between the common law and canon law definitions, some courts make the
choice based on the unlikelihood that the legislature that adopted the
statute would want to follow English spiritual law.
For example, a decision interpreting Maryland's adultery statute
concluded that, given that the statute was enacted in 1715-"at a time
when anticlerical feeling was high"-it was unlikely that the legislature
intended to adopt the canon law definition.103 Reinforcing the court's
conclusion was the fact that the common law definition more closely
tracked the Biblical definition, which the court reasoned would have had a
greater influence on the Puritan framers.' 04 Similarly, another court thought
it absurd that, as a common law court, it would follow anything but the
common law and derided the canon law as being the product of "[t]he
Popish clergy," which it described as "zealous abettors of arbitrary ower"
who introduced into the canon law "the imperial laws of Rome."
Yet, in the particular circumstance of adultery, other courts have
concluded that it makes more sense to look to the canon law. Because
adultery, unlike other crimes, was not a common law crime, they have
reasoned that the common law provides less assistance than it normally
does as a tool for statutory interpretation, whereas the canon law definition
is more appropriate than it otherwise would be because it was the
ecclesiastical courts in England that were given the task of defining and
punishing people for engaging in adulterous conduct.10 6 These courts also
reasoned that because adulterous conduct was largely unregulated by the
common law, the canon law definition (which, at the time America was
founded, was the definition accepted by all Christian nations) in effect
became the common law that the colonists brought to America with
them. 10 7 In addition, after identifying the prevention of harm to the
103. Evans v. Murff, 135 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1955).
104. See id.
105. State v. Lash, 16 N.J.L. 380, 385 (1838).
106. See Chase v. U.S., 7 App. D.C. 149, 154 (1895); U.S. v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 578 (D. Or.
1888); Commonwealth v. Call, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 509, 511 (1839).
107. See Chase, 7 App. D.C. at 155; Clapox, 35 F. at 578; State v. Hasty, 96 N.W. 1115,
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marriage and the resultant misery and demoralization it produced in
families as the purpose of the law of adultery, these courts concluded that
only the canon law definition would fully effectuate that purpose.Ios
Despite the fact that courts would pick either the canon law or the
common law as their tool for interpreting adultery laws, the ultimate end
product of most interpretive processes usually ended up resembling the
hybrid definition of adultery. This is because the statutes would often come
to the court with a recent legislative amendment that would partially amend
the original adultery statute by adding a sentence specifying that the statute
did apply in a given circumstance, such as when there is sexual intercourse
between a married man and an unmarried woman. While such an
amendment might thus make clear that extramarital conduct by a married
man constituted adultery, it might remain unclear whether the third party
was also guilty of adultery or merely fornication.109 To the extent that the
rule of the amending language tracked the canon law (say, by specifying
that sexual intercourse between an unmarried woman and a married man
constitutes adultery), courts would conclude that the original language of
the statute must otherwise follow the common law (otherwise, the
amendment would not have been necessary)." 0 Similarly, if the rule of the
amending language tracked the common law (say, by specifying that an
unmarried man is guilty of adultery if he engages in sexual intercourse with
a married woman), courts would conclude that the original language of the
statute must otherwise follow the canon law."' The end result was thus to
arrive at a definition of adultery that was far more encompassing than
either the common or canon law definitions standing alone.
A second interpretive question facing courts was whether the term
"adultery" necessarily meant the same thing in both the criminal adultery
laws and the statutes governing divorce. This question would typically
come up in the situation in which there was a clearly established definition
of the term adultery in one of the two contexts, and the court was trying to
determine its meaning in the other context.
At first blush, it seems somewhat nonsensical to interpret the term
differently in the two contexts, and thus, several courts would hold that
there was no reason to believe the term meant something different in each
of these contexts.1 2 Then-either by relying on earlier precedents holding
1115-16 (Iowa 1903); Bashford v. Wells, 96 P. 663, 666 (Kan. 1908); State v. Holland, 145 S.W.
522, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912); State v. Ryan, 234 P. 811, 814 (Or. 1925).
108. See Holland, 145 S.W. at 523; Ryan, 234 P. at 814. See also Call, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) at
511 (noting that canon law definition enforces policy expressed in preamble of enforcing "due
observance of the marriage covenants").
109. See U.S. v. Shaughnessy, 221 F.2d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 1955); Evans v. Murff 135 F. Supp.
907, 911 (D. Md. 1955).
110. See State v. Bigelow, 92 A. 978, 978-79 (Vt. 1915).
111. See Call, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) at 511.
112. Id. at 512-13; Holland, 145 S.W. at 523; State v. Byrum, 83 N.W. 207,208 (Neb. 1900);
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that the wife can obtain a divorce if her husband has sexual intercourse
with an unmarried woman or simply asserting that "[n]o one would deny"
that the wife would have the right to obtain a divorce in that
circumstance-these courts would reason that this same conduct on her
husband's part should subject him to a criminal prosecution for adultery." 3
Yet in several cases, courts interpreted the term "adultery" as used in
the criminal statutes differently from that used in the divorce context, with
the common law definition applying in the former context and the canon
law definition applying in the latter context. These courts reasoned that
because the ecclesiastical courts in England were the only courts with the
power to grant a divorce, it made sense that the word adultery as used in
divorce statutes would have the meaning given to it by the canon law,
under which infidelity by either husband or wife was grounds for divorce
without regard to whether the third person was married or unmarried."14
But because the crime of adultery was derived from the common law civil
cause of action, it made sense to give it the narrower scope that the
common law gave to it." 5
These same questions of statutory interpretation presented themselves
when courts were forced to determine the definition of adultery in cases in
which civil tort actions were brought for interference with the marital
relationship. As indicated above, while the common law of England did
not punish adultery as a crime, it did provide husbands with the right to
bring two private civil actions against those who interfered with the marital
relationship. The first of these, referred to alternatively as enticement or
abduction, allowed the husband to sue for damages associated with the
"taking. . . away" of his wife by means of persuasion or otherwise (to
which the wife lacked the legal power to consent), with the damages
considered to be the loss of the wife's consortium and services.16 The
second of these, referred to alternatively as seduction or criminal
conversation, was a common law action for "trespass" that a husband could
bring against a person who committed adultery with his wife, with the
damages being the harm to the husband's marriage and family honor as
well as the risk of placing the legitimacy of the husband's children into
State v. Fellows, 6 N.W. 239, 239-40 (Wis. 1880).
113. See Call, 38 Mass. (21 Pick) at 512-13; Holland, 145 S.W. at 523; Byrum, 83 N.W. at
208; Fellows, 6 N.W. at 239-40.
114. See Smitherman v. State, 27 Ala. 23, 25 (1855); Nelson v. Nelson, 164 A.2d 234, 235
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1960); State v. Searle, 56 Vt. 516, 518-19 (1884); see also Panhorstv. Panhorst,
390 S.E.2d 376, 378 n.3 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
115. See Smitherman, 27 Ala. at 25; Nelson, 164 A.2d at 235; Searle, 56 Vt. at 518-19; see
also J.L.M. v. S.A.K., 18 So. 3d 384, 391 n.5 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (Pittman, J., concurring in the
result) (describing as a "dubious proposition" the idea that spousal-support law should precisely
match the criminal law).
116. See Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992) (citing Marshall Davidson,
Comment, Stealing Love in Tennessee: The ThiefGoes Free, 56 TENN. L. REv. 629,630-31 (1989);
WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 873 (4th ed. 1971)); 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at 139.
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doubt.' 1 7 In the United States, these two torts evolved into the torts of
alienation of affections and criminal conversation.' 1 8
The tort of criminal conversation is an action brought against a person
who has sexual relations with the plaintiff s spouse. It is a simple tort
consisting solely of the element of having sex with the plaintiff's spouse,
with the only defense being the plaintiff-spouse's consent.120 The tort of
alienation of affections is an action brought against a person who has taken
actions to deprive the plaintiff of his spouse's affections.' 2 1 The tort does
not require that the defendant have any romantic or sexual relationship
with the plaintiffs spouse; all that matters is that he knew of the marital
relationship and acted for the purpose of adversely affecting it.122
At early common law, the torts of criminal conversation and alienation
of affections could only be brought by a wronged husband; a wronged wife
had no comparable right to bring such causes of action against third parties
who interfered with the marital relationship.123 Moreover, the wife's
consent to having her affections alienated or committing adultery was not a
defense: the law viewed the wife as the husband's property, and these were
causes of action to vindicate the husband's property interest in his wife's
services.124 Indeed, in the words of the common law, "it was considered
that she was no more capable of giving a consent which would prejudice
the husband's interests than was his horse." 25
After states enacted Married Women's Property Acts, which gave
women the right to own property and sue in their own names, common law
courts had to decide whether to either abolish the torts of alienation of
affections and criminal conversation or instead to extend their reach so as
to permit women to sue for such wrongs.126 Courts similarly were forced to
117. See Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424 (citing Marshall Davidson, Comment, Stealing Love in
Tennessee: The Thief Goes Free, 56 TENN. L. REv. 629, 630-31 (1989)); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 69, at 139-40.
118. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424 (citing Marshall Davidson, Comment, Stealing Love in
Tennessee: The Thief Goes Free, 56 TENN. L. REv. 629, 630-31 (1989)); Helsel v. Noellsch, 107
S.W.3d 231, 231-32 (Mo. 2003).
119. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 442 (2001).
120. Id. It is not necessary that the defendant know or believe that the person was married, and
indeed, it is not a defense to liability that the plaintiffs spouse lied about his or her marital status.
See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 685 cmt. f (1977).
121. 2 DOBBS, supra note 119, § 442.
122. Id.
123. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 930 (Md. 1980); 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 683 cmt. d (1977); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 643, 651
(2001).
124. See O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 696 (Idaho 1986); Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d
422,425 (Ky. 1992); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS 916 (5th
ed. 1984).
125. WLLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 (4th ed. 1971).
126. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424.
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confront that choice after determining that the common law rule violated
federal and state equal protection clauses and state equal rights
amendments by discriminating on the basis of gender.1 2 7
Those courts that opted to extend the actions to women rather than
abolishing the actions altogether re-theorized the rationale for the torts.
When only husbands could bring them, the initial rationales for the torts
were both to vindicate the husband's property interests in his wife's
services1 28 and to compensate him for the risk of "spurious issue" that the
third party's conduct introduced,129 thus tracking the common law rationale
for punishing adultery. The revised theory largely tracked the canon law
approach to defining adultery: preserving marital harmony by deterring
wrongful interference with it; o providing compensatory damages for
humiliation, disgrace, dishonor, and mental suffering;131 and punishing the
invasion of the exclusive right to marital intercourse. 132
Beyond criminal and civil actions that define adultery in order to
directly punish adulterous behavior, the question of how to define
"adultery" has likewise arisen in murder cases in which the defendant
raises a heat-of-passion defense based on discovering that his or her spouse
has committed adultery. Specifically, courts have had to confront the
question whether the term "adultery" in this context must track the
definition of adultery used in criminal adultery statutes.
On the one hand, courts hold that, at the very least, the definition of
adultery in this context requires that there be a marriage, and thus, they
refuse to permit the defense to be raised in cases involving unmarried
couples.13 In so holding, courts will sometimes cite the definition of
127. See Kline, 414 A.2d at 932-33; Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414,421 (Miss. 1999) (Smith,
J., specially concurring); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 151 n.7 (Pa. 1976); Felsenthal v.
McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729, 729-30 (Tex. 1973); Cahoon v. Pelton, 342 P.2d 94, 99 (Utah 1959);
Irwin v. Coluccio, 648 P.2d 458, 460 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
128. See Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424; Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231,231-32 (Mo. 2003).
129. See Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424; Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 617,621 (Md. 2000); Oppenheim v.
Kridel, 140 N.E. 227, 228 (N.Y. 1923); Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 16 (Utah 1991).
130. See Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424; Helsel, 107 S.W.3d at 231-32; Russo v. Sutton, 422
S.E.2d 750, 752 (S.C. 1992).
131. See Oppenheim, 140 N.E. at 228.
132. See id.; Norton, 818 P.2d at 15-16.
133. See Somchith v. State, 527 S.E.2d 546, 548 (Ga. 2000); People v. McCarthy, 547 N.E.2d
459,463 (Ill. 1989); People v. Eagen, 357 N.W.2d 710, 711-12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). As several
commentators have noted, this limitation seems questionable given the rationale for the heat-of-
passion defense. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10 ("The rule of mitigation does not,
however, extend beyond the marital relationship so as to include engaged persons, divorced couples
and unmarried lovers-as where a man is enraged at the discovery of his mistress in the sexual
embrace of another man. This limitation seems questionable, however, at least in cases where there
existed a long-standing relationship comparable to that of husband and wife."); Joshua Dressler,
Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
421, 440 (1982) ("[A] married person who kills upon sight of adultery commits manslaughter, but
an unmarried individual who kills upon sight of unfaithfulness by one's lover or fianc6 is a
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adultery found in the state's criminal adultery statute.' 34 Yet beyond that,
courts have decoupled the definition of adultery from the narrower
definition often found in criminal adultery statutes. For example, in a case
in which the criminal adultery statute only applied when the married
person and the third person either "habitually" engaged in adultery or did
so while living together, a court concluded that what is required to invoke
the heat-of-passion defense is not adultery in its legal, criminal sense but
rather in its "ecclesiastical" sense, in other words, a "violation of the
marriage bed." 3 5
This decoupling is, of course, consistent with the rationale for the
defense: it is, after all, the violation of the marital relationship, and not the
technical violation of the state's adultery laws, that triggers the emotional
response in the spouse. Moreover, given that the defense is recognized in
every state, including those lacking criminal adultery laws and fault-based
divorce schemes, adultery in the provocation context surely cannot be too
closely tied to its definition in other, substantive contexts. 36
Despite some divisions among courts, the trend of the decisions over
time has been consistent across all four of these contexts. In each of them,
the trend has been toward a broader definition of adultery that does not
differentiate between male and female extramarital conduct and that views
the harm caused by adultery to be not the risk to bloodline purity but rather
the breach of marital vows and the attendant harm to the relationship and
to families.
111. THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ADULTERY TO SAME-SEX
CONDUCT
So how is it possible that a court might conclude that extra-marital
conduct between a married person and someone of the same sex does not
constitute "adultery" within the meaning of a criminal adultery statute, a
fault-based divorce scheme, or in other contexts? Cases so holding rely on
one or more of four different (but often overlapping) rationales: (1) the
statute's terms require sexual activity between two people of the opposite
sex; (2) the statute, while not in terms requiring that the activity occur
between two people of the opposite sex, requires (or is interpreted to
murderer. Only a highly unrealistic belief about passion can explain this rule in terms of excusing
conduct. It is implausible to believe that when an actor observes his or her loved one in an act of
sexual disloyalty, that actor will suffer from less anger simply because the disloyal partner is not the
actor's spouse.").
134. See Somchith, 527 S.E.2d at 548.
135. See, e.g., Price v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 474,484 (1885); see also Dennis v. State, 661
A.2d 175, 180 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (raising but not deciding the question ofwhether adultery
in the provocation context requires proof of coitus or whether other forms of sexual conduct
suffice).
136. See Vera Bergelson, Justification or Excuse? Exploring the Meaning ofProvocation, 42
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 307, 317 & n.62 (2009).
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require) a form of sexual activity that can only occur between people of the
opposite sex; (3) the governing statutory scheme identifies adultery and
sodomy as distinct categories of misconduct; or (4) the statute is
ambiguous, and the court relies on the common law definition of adultery
instead of the canon law rationale.
Perhaps the most straightforward rationale for concluding that same-sex
conduct does not constitute "adultery" is in the situation in which the
statute, in its terms, defines adultery as sexual activity between two people
of the opposite sex. In that situation, sexual activity with someone of the
same sex simply does not meet the statutory definition of the offense.' 37
Most modern adultery statutes-including all of those in states that either
permit same-sex couples to marry, or recognize same-sex marriages from
other states-use general terms such as "person," 38 and courts interpreting
statutes using such a generic term have sometimes relied on that to
conclude that they reach sexual activity with those other than one's spouse
regardless of sex. 1 39 But a handful of adultery-related statutes use gender-
specific language, including (1) those that codify the common law
approach, which define adultery as the situation in which "a married
woman has sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband";140 (2)
those that define adultery as sexual activity between a married person and
someone of "the opposite sex";14' and (3) those that require that the
offending conduct occur between a "man" and a "woman." 2
Somewhat less clear-cut are those statutes falling into the second
category, whose terms do not define adultery as occurring between people
of the opposite sex but specify the type of sexual conduct constituting
adultery (or are so interpreted). A handful of statutes are extremely
specific: Kansas, for example, defines adultery as "sexual intercourse or
137. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 180 Ill. App. 578, 580 (1913) ("The first count contains no
averment as to the sex of either J. W. Martin or Marie Watson. Even if there is a presumption as to
Marie Watson from the Christian name, there can be no presumption from the initials of J. W.
Martin, hence from anything that appears in that count the defendants may be both of the same sex.
Adultery and fornication are statutory offenses. The alleged offenses are not charged in the language
of the statute since the defendants are not averred to be a man and a woman.").
138. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
§ 14 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney
2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2010).
139. See, e.g., Owens v. Owens, 274 S.E.2d 484, 485-86 (Ga. 1981) (fault-based divorce
statute).
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West 2010) (emphasis added) (criminal adultery statute).
141. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2010) (criminal adultery statute); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-4-3 (2010) (fault-based divorce statute).
142. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2010) (criminal adultery statute); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 97-
29-1 (West 2010) (criminal adultery statute); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-60 to -70 (2009) (criminal
adultery statute). Interestingly, Idaho, while defining adultery in gender-specific terms under its
criminal adultery statute, defines it in gender neutral terms for purposes of fault-based divorce. See
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-604 (2010).
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sodomy" 43 while New York defines it as "sexual intercourse, oral sexual
conduct or anal sexual conduct," clearly coverin forms of sexual activity
that can occur between people of the same sex.1 However, most statutes,
including those of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode
Island, simply refer to "sexual intercourse."' 5 In this instance, courts must
address whether the phrase "sexual intercourse" includes non-coital
intercourse, such as oral or anal sexual conduct.
Rarely, however, does the adultery statute itself define the phrase
"sexual intercourse," and thus, courts look to other sources of statutory or
decisional law to determine whether the term is a blanket one that covers
all forms of sexual activity or whether it is limited to something narrower,
such as penile-vaginal intercourse (or, in some cases, they do not look to
any sources at all but simply declare it to have a particular meaning).146
Moreover, in some instances, the adultery statute or divorce statute does
not itself even require sexual intercourse; rather, the court first looks to
common law or secondary sources to conclude that "adultery" requires
''sexual intercourse," and then looks to additional sources to define the
phrase "sexual intercourse."
For example, in the New Hampshire Supreme Court decision discussed
in the Introduction, in which the husband sought a fault-based divorce on
the grounds of adultery based on his wife having sexual relations with
another woman, the divorce statute at issue did not define the term
"adultery."l 47 Rather, the court relied on two sources to first conclude that
"adultery" requires "sexual intercourse": the parallel criminal adultery
statute defining adultery as such and a dictionary definition.148 In turn, the
court relied on the same dictionary for the definition of the phrase "sexual
intercourse," which defined it as "coitus" or, more specifically, the
"'insertion of the penis in the vagina[],"' which the court stated, b
definition, can only take place between people of the opposite gender.' 4
In looking to sources, it is difficult not to conclude that courts select
those that will support the definition of adultery they wish to find. Thus,
for example, a Virginia court, in deciding that adultery required penile-
vaginal intercourse, relied on a case defining heterosexual rape, which
143. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (West 2010) (emphasis added) (criminal adultery statute).
144. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw §§ 170(4), 200(4) (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added) (fault-based
divorce statute).
145. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3
(2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2010). Rhode
Island's differs slightly, referring to "illicit" sexual intercourse.
146. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 2 Ohio N.P. 342, 342 (C.P. 1895) ("The offense of
sodomy manifestly does not fall within this defmition.").
147. In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1011 (N.H. 2003).
148. Id. at 1011-12.
149. Id. at 1011 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRDNEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 441 (unabridged
ed. 1961)).
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rather naturally required penetration of the male sexual organ into the
female sexual organ.' 50 It thus concluded that while two individuals of the
same sex can engage in "sexual relations" (including fellatio, cunnilingus,
and anal sex), these types of activities are distinct from "sexual
intercourse" and thus do not constitute adultery.' 5 ' And a lower New
Hampshire court decision, which pre-dated the New Hampshire Supreme
Court decision discussed above, relied on the fact that a provision setting
forth the definitions of terms used in a chapter of the Criminal Code
governing sexual assault offenses that defined the term "sexual
penetration" to mean "'sexual intercourse' as well as various other sexual
acts [including] cunnilingus, fellatio, [and] anal intercourse" and from this
concluded that "sexual intercourse" must be something different from
fellatio, cunnilingus, and anal intercourse. 152 Similarly, a New York case
(decided before the definition of adultery was clarified, as set forth above)
relied on the use of the phrase "sexual intercourse" in the context of a
statute involving sexual conduct with a dead body to conclude that sodomy
was outside the scope of that phrase.153 Moreover, depending on which
dictionary a court selects to define "sexual intercourse," one can find either
a broad or narrow definition of the phrase that either does or does not
include non-coital acts.154 In contrast, a South Carolina court rejected these
sorts of verbal semantics in interpreting its divorce and alimony statute,
stating that a definition that includes only coital acts is "unduly narrow and
overly dependent upon the term sexual intercourse" and concluding that it
suffices that there is "extra-marital sexual activity."' 5 5
Moreover, if the statute is silent, why conclude that adultery requires
"sexual intercourse"? A New Jersey decision, for example, cited the fact
that the phrase "sexual penetration" in the state criminal code includes
vaginal sexual intercourse as well as cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal
intercourse as a basis for concluding that same-sex sexual conduct falls
within the scope of the phrase "adultery," thus at least implicitly defining
adultery as requiring sexual penetration rather than sexual intercourse.
In any event, to the extent courts in states that recognize same-sex
150. See Glaze v. Glaze, No. HJ-1323-4, 1998 WL 972306, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 31, 1998)
(citing Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 779 (Va. 1989)).
15 1. Id.
152. Collins v. Collins, No. 00-M-1926, 2001 WL 34012426, at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. Oct. 25,
2001).
153. Cohen v. Cohen, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427-28 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
154. Compare In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1011 (N.H. 2003) (citing 1961 edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary with narrow definition and concluding that same-sex
sexual activity does not count as sexual intercourse), with Menge v. Menge, 491 So. 2d 700, 702
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (citing 1981 edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary with broad
definition and concluding that same-sex sexual activity counts as sexual intercourse).
155. RGM v. DEM, 410 S.E.2d 564, 567 (S.C. 1991).
156. See S.B. v. S.J.B., 609 A.2d 124, 126 (N.J. 1992).
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marriage rely on the definition of the phrase "sexual intercourse," judges
may, as demonstrated above, have to resort to the definition of that phrase
in other parts of its laws. As an example, Connecticut law defines the term
"sexual intercourse" to include vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse,
fellatio, and cunnilingus.157 Thus, a Connecticut court might rely on this to
conclude that same-sex sexual conduct is adultery. Yet, to the extent that
courts do so, they should at least rely on statutory definitions that are
related rather than those involving conduct with dead bodies and the like.
A third reason to hold that same-sex extramarital conduct does not
constitute "adultery" is in situations in which the governing statutory
scheme distinguishes adultery and either sodomy or homosexuality as
different forms of misconduct serving as grounds for divorce or criminal
liability. Thus, for example, if a divorce statute provides separate grounds
for divorce, one of which is the spouse's "adultery" and another of which
is the fact that the spouse either is homosexual or has engaged in an act of
sodomy, this would be a basis for requiring that the person sue for divorce
citing one ground rather than the other.
This sort of argument is most clear cut-albeit hyper-technical-in the
situation in which the very jurisdiction where, say, a divorce is sought lists
those as separate grounds, with the remedy for the party seeking divorce
being that they re-file stating the proper ground.15 8 But in some cases, the
statute at issue lists adultery and other grounds for divorce yet does not list
homosexuality or sodomy as a ground for divorce. Nonetheless, one such
court relied on the fact that in two other states as well as in England,
adultery is identified as a ground for divorce separate from either sodomy
or crimes against nature to conclude that under the state's own divorce
statute, adultery must mean something different from sodomy! 159
Certainly, if it were common historically and across the states to list
these as separate grounds, that might support a conclusion that the state's
own statute did not encompass sodomy or homosexuality. Yet historically,
none of the states listed sodomy or homosexuality as a ground separate
from adultery, and England added it as a separate ground for divorce in the
mid- 1 800s, when it expanded the bases upon which a woman could obtain
a divorcel 60 (well after the founding of the United States and thus a
dubious guide for common law interpretation). And today, only four
157. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(2) (West 2010).
158. See, e.g., Glaze v. Glaze, No. HJ-1323-4, 1998 WL 972306, at *2 & n.1 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 31, 1998).
159. Cohen v. Cohen, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
160. See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND
EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 474, at 447-48 (3d ed. 1859); see also An Act to Amend the
Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § 27
(Eng.); Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937,1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 57, § 11 (Eng.).
119
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
states-Alabama, Delaware, New Jersey, and Virginia-list sodomy or
homosexuality as a ground for divorce separate from adultery.'61
A comparable argument could be made in the criminal context: since,
historically, every state criminalized sodomy, and virtually every state
criminalized adultery, those statutes must therefore refer to two different
things, with the latter involving extra-marital heterosexual conduct and the
former covering homosexual conduct, extra-marital or otherwise. Indeed,
the absence of any cases addressing the question of whether same-sex
extramarital conduct constitutes adultery in the criminal context suggests
that this was the path that prosecutors historically followed. After all, why
go through the trouble of seeking an adultery prosecution, with its
attendant uncertainties regarding the question whether the canon or
common law definitions are followed, for example, when you can take the
much simpler path of prosecuting someone for sodomy?1 2
Finally, there are those circumstances in which the statute is
ambiguous, perhaps simply prohibiting "adultery" or stating it as a ground
for divorce without defining it, and the court relies on the common law
definition to interpret the statute. Although only a handful of criminal
adultery statutes leave the term undefined, including Maryland's,163
161. See ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(a)(2), (5) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1503(6),
1505(b)(2) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2(a), (h) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(A)(1)
(2010); see also In re Marriage of Pascavage, No. 923-86, 1994 WL 838136, at *4 n.8 (Del. Fam.
Ct. Aug. 15, 1994) (citing Panama statute); Grove v. Grove, No. 0251-93-3, 1994 WL 259324, at
*2 n. 1 (Va. Ct. App. June 14, 1994) (citing North Carolina statute); SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE'S
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 5.46(B), at 407 & Supp. at 63-64 (5th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2008)
(noting that an earlier version of the North Carolina statute listed adultery and homosexual acts as
separate grounds). While unclear on the question of whether an act of sodomy is a form of adultery
or an independent ground of divorce, several early decisions and sources have indicated that
sodomy qualifies as "extreme cruelty," an independent ground of divorce found in most states. See
W. v. W., 226 A.2d 860, 861-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); H. v. H., 157 A.2d 721,726 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 2 Ohio N.P. 342,342 (C.P. 1895); Poler v.
Poler, 73 P. 372, 373 (Wash. 1903) (citing 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND
SEPARATION § 1830, at 755 (1891); JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 474, at 447-48 (3d ed. 1859);
JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 220b, at 314-16 (4th ed.
1889); JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, § 525, at 553 (1882); 9
AM. & ENG. ENCYC. OF LAW 747, 764 (2d ed. 1898)).
162. Cf Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (2008) ("Judges and prosecutors also failed
to invoke forfeiture as a sufficient basis to admit unconfronted statements in the cases that did apply
the dying-declarations exception. This failure, too, is striking. At a murder trial, presenting evidence
that the defendant was responsible for the victim's death would have been no more difficult than
putting on the government's case in chief Yet prosecutors did not attempt to obtain admission of
dying declarations on wrongful procurement-of-absence grounds before going to the often
considerable trouble of putting on evidence to show that the crime victim had not believed he could
recover.").
163. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501(a) (West 2010). Although one lower federal court
has interpreted the scope of the Maryland adultery statute in the context of federal immigration law,
Evans v. Murif, 135 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1955), an appellate court in Maryland has noted
that the state's own courts have not yet determined whether it encompasses the common law or
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virtually all fault-based divorce statutes leave the term undefined. 16
Once again, the New Hampshire Supreme Court case is instructive in
this regard. In that case, the court was called on to interpret the meaning of
the word "adultery" as used in its fault-based divorce statute. Because the
term was unidentified in the statute, the court looked to, inter alia, the term
as defined in the criminal statute, which requires an act of "sexual
intercourse." After citing cases that it said stood for the proposition that
adultery in the criminal and divorce context were equated with one
another, the court then quoted cases from the early 1800s that held that
"'[a]dultery is committed whenever there is an intercourse from which
spurious issue may arise . ... '"'6 The court then reasoned that "[a]s
'spurious issue' can only arise from intercourse between a man and a
woman, criminal adultery could only be committed with a person of the
opposite gender."' 66
By citing the "spurious issue" language of earlier cases, the court
majority was wittingly, or unwittingly, endorsing the common law concept
of adultery. Yet, in this regard, the court's conclusion was inconsistent
with the text of the then-existing New Hampshire criminal adultery statute;
developments in the meaning of the term "adultery" in other, related areas
of the law; and the trend nationally in interpreting the meaning of the
phrase adultery.
As demonstrated earlier, the "spurious issue" rationale for adultery laws
is the common law rationale, under which not only would same-sex sexual
activity not constitute adultery but neither would opposite-sex sexual
activity between a married man and an unmarried woman. Yet New
Hampshire's current criminal adultery statute, which was extant at the time
the New Hampshire Supreme Court case was decided, clearly rejects the
gendered common law approach in favor of the canon law one, providing
that someone is guilty of adultery if "being a marriedperson, he engages
in sexual intercourse with another not his spouse ... 167 Moreover, as
early as 1890, the New Hampshire Supreme Court had expanded the
common law cause of action for criminal conversation-the tort analogue
to the crime of adultery-so as to allow not just the husband to bring such
actions against those who have sexual intercourse with their wives but also
to permit wives to bring such actions against those who have sexual
intercourse with their husbands, 168 an expansion that is consistent with the
canon law definition, Payne v. Payne, 366 A.2d 405, 409-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
164. See supra note 32.
165. In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1011-12 (N.H. 2003) (quoting State v. Wallace, 9
N.H. 515, 517 (1838)).
166. Id. at 1012.
167. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (2010) (emphasis added).
168. See Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 36 (N.H. 1984) (citing Seaver v. Adams, 19 A.
776, 776-77 (N.H. 1890)).
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canon law approach to adultery and inconsistent with the common law
"spurious issue" rationale. The majority brushed to one side arguments that
it should interpret the term adultery to cover non-coital acts on the ground
that such an interpretation would be most consistent with a focus on
"marital loyalty" and a "disfavor of one spouse's violation of the marriage
contract with another"-the language of the canon law-reasoning that
such a legislative purpose was nowhere to be found.169
In contrast to the New Hampshire court, courts in other jurisdictions
have interpreted the term adultery as used in their fault-based divorce
statutes as encompassing same-sex extramarital conduct.' 70 Although few
provide much analysis, those that do clearly embrace the language of the
canon law, focusing on the breach of the marital vow and its attendant
injury to the other spouse.171
Case law interpreting the application of the torts of criminal
conversation and alienation of affections to same-sex extramarital conduct
is almost non-existent. This may be in part due to the fact that only a
handful of jurisdictions still recognize these causes of action; in the 20th
Century, most states abolished the causes of action either through common
law decisions or by means of so-called "heart balm" statutes.' 72 Of the
states that permit or potentially recognize same-sex marriage, all have
abolished these causes of action,173 with the possible exception of New
Mexico.174 One Arkansas decision upheld (with little discussion) the
169. In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d at 1012.
170. See Patin v. Patin, 371 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Menge v. Menge, 491 So.
2d 700, 702 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881, 882 (La. Ct. App.
1978)); S.B. v. S.J.B., 609 A.2d 124, 126-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992); RGM v. DEM, 410
S.E.2d 564, 566-67 (S.C. 1991).
171. See S.B., 609 A.2d at 126-27.
172. States that may continue to recognize the tort of alienation of affections include: Hawaii,
Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. See Michele Crissman,
Note, Alienation ofAffections: An Ancient Tort-But Still Alive in South Dakota, 48 S.D. L. REV.
518, 525 n.77 (2003); see also Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231,231 (Mo. 2003) (abolishing the
tort in Missouri). States that may continue to recognize the tort of criminal conversation include:
Hawaii, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah.
See Batchelor, supra note 37, at 1911 n.3.
173. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-572b, 52-572f (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 3-103 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 47B (West 2010); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 460:2 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 2010); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a
(McKinney 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-42 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001
(2010); Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 932-33 (Md. 1980); Feldman, 480 A.2d at 34, 36.
174. In New Mexico, the existence of the two causes of action is unclear. New Mexico's
Supreme Court recognized the tort of alienation of affections in a 1923 decision, Birchfield v.
Birchfield, 217 P. 616, 617-19 (N.M. 1923), and although the supreme court has not abolished it,
in general, lower court decisions hold that New Mexico will not allow tort actions related to "freely-
made sexual decisions between adults." See, e.g., Padwa v. Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234,1241 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1999); see also Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 610 (N.M. 1991) (citing such
lower court decisions for their broad principles). The New Mexico Supreme Court has reviewed a
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application of the tort of alienation of affections in the case of a
heterosexual married couple in which the wife had a relationship with
another woman.'7 5 To be sure, the policies in favor of applying it are the
same; however, once one identifies harm to the marital relationship as the
focus of the torts, it makes no difference whether the harm is caused by a
third party of the same sex or whether it involves a marriage between two
people of the same-sex.176
However, a handful of cases have considered the applicability of two
other "heart balm" causes of action-breach of a promise to marry and
seduction of a child-to same-sex couples and same-sex conduct.
The cause of action for breach of a promise to marry is a hybrid tort-
contract action that allows a plaintiff to sue the defendant for breaching a
promise to marry him or her and to claim damages for, among other things,
loss of reputation, emotional harm, and expenditures made in preparation
for the marriage. 7 7 Although many states that permit or potentially
recognize same-sex marriage have abolished this action,17 8 it continues to
be recognized in Rhode Island,179 in limited circumstances in Maryland,
and possibly in New Mexico.'' A Washington decision suggested, in
dicta, that the logic of the breach of promise to marry action might apply to
a same-sex couple,182 reasoning that seems sound given that the same sorts
of damages-reputational, emotional, and actual expenditures in
preparation for marriage--could occur in that context. Indeed, the logic of
the decision would suggest that states such as Washington as well as
case involving a criminal conversation cause of action but decided the case on grounds unrelated to
the question of whether such a cause of action exists. Keyes v. Keyes, 199 P. 361, 361-62 (N.M.
1921).
175. See Blaylock v. Strecker, 724 S.W.2d 470, 471-72, 476 (Ark. 1987).
176. See REYNOLDS, supra note 161, § 5.46(A)(1), at 400, § 5.46(B), at 406.
177. See Jeffrey D. Kobar, Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1770, 1770 (1985). It is a hybrid tort-contract action in that it sounds in contract (the contract being
the mutual promises to marry), but the damages are based on tort principles in that the plaintiff is
able to recover for such things as loss to reputation, mental anguish, and injury to health, in addition
to recovering for expenditures made in preparation for the marriage and loss of the pecuniary and
social advantages that the promised marriage offered. See Bukowski v. Kuznia, 186 N.W. 311, 311-
12 (Minn. 1922); Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (Wash. 1977); Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 359, 407 (2008); Kobar, supra. In addition, some states allow for aggravated
and punitive damages under certain circumstances, such as when the defendant's acts were
malicious or fraudulent. See Stanard, 565 P.2d at 96.
178. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 47A (2010).
179. See Cliff v. Pinto, 60 A.2d 704, 704-07 (R.I. 1948). See also R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 9-1-
42 (2010) (eliminating all other heart balm causes of action except breach of promise to marry).
180. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 3-102 (West 2010) (allowing the action to be brought if
the plaintiff is pregnant).
181. The New Mexico Supreme Court adjudicated a case in which breach of promise of
marriage was raised, but the case was decided on grounds unrelated to whether the action exists.
State ex. rel. Peteet v. Frenger, 278 P. 208, 208-09 (N.M. 1929).
182. See State ex. rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3d 887, 898 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
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Oregon, 183 which both allow same-sex couples to enter into domestic
partnerships and still recognize the cause of action for breach of a promise
to marry, might likewise recognize a cause of action for breach of a
promise to enter into a domestic partnership.
The cause of action for seduction historically allowed the father of a
female child still living at home to bring an action against her seducer.' 84
The common law action has since been modified to make it gender neutral,
extending its protections to male children and allowin mothers to bring
the actions, thus making female third parties liable.' Although many
states have, through their heart balm statutes, eliminated the cause of
action for seduction,' 86 a number of states did not abolish them.' The
only case to consider the issue in the context of same-sex seduction
appeared to view that as falling squarely within the scope of the tort.'88
Few decisions have addressed the question whether the heat-of-passion
defense based on witnessing an act of spousal adultery applies to same-sex
conduct. A Louisiana court rejected the defense in the context of a case in
which the defendant killed his same-sex partner after allegedly catching
him in an act of adultery. While citing its prior decisions holding that
same-sex extramarital conduct constituted adultery, the court rejected the
claim on the ground that the two were not married to one another, which
as described earlier, is an accepted requirement for invoking the defense.' 0
IV. WHY DOES IT MATTER?
When confronted with the question of whether criminal adultery laws
and related doctrines should be deemed applicable to same-sex couples and
same-sex conduct, one might be tempted to shrug her shoulders and view it
as irrelevant or even a good thing. Possible reactions might range anywhere
from viewing it as technically interesting but ultimately irrelevant,
reasoning that a person seeking a divorce can simply state a different
183. See, e.g., Cade v. Thompson, 225 P.2d 396, 400 (Or. 1950); see also OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31.980, .982 (West 2010) (abolishing criminal conversation and alienation of affections
but not other heart balm actions).
184. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 701 & cmt. c (1977); 2 DoBBS, supra note 119,§ 443.
185. See Edwards v. Moore, 699 So. 2d 220, 221-23 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Franklin v. Hill,
444 S.E.2d 778, 779 & n.1, 780-81 (Ga. 1994); see also Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275,291
& n. 1 (Colo. 1988) (Mullarkey, J., specially concurring); Parker v. Bruner, 683 S.W.2d 265, 269
n.2 (Mo. 1985) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
186. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 2010); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a
(McKinney 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (2010).
187. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-572b, -572f(2010); D.C. CODE § 16-923 (2010).
188. See Brayman v. Deloach, 439 S.E.2d 709, 710-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
189. See State v. Jack, 596 So. 2d 323, 325-26 & n.l (La. Ct. App. 1992). But see People v.
Washington, 130 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98-99 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (allowing it to be invoked in the case
of an unmarried same-sex couple).
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ground (sodomy or homosexuality, say, instead of adultery), or the
government can prosecute the person on a different ground (for committing
sodomy, say, instead of adultery). Alternatively, one might view it as a
good thing: for once, there is an area of the law in which heterosexuals,
rather than homosexuals, get treated more harshly. Yet, I contend that for
numerous reasons, important principles of equality on the basis of gender
and sexual orientation are furthered by interpreting adultery laws and
related doctrines to apply to same-sex conduct, and by amending those that
fail to be so interpreted.
First, to the extent that the law punishes opposite-sex adultery while
leaving same-sex adultery unpunished, it is perpetuating a form of sexual
orientation discrimination built upon a form of sex discrimination: the
punishment or lack thereof turns solely on the gender of the individuals
involved in the act of adultery. This is the same equality-based argument
that Professors Andrew Koppelman and Sylvia Law have persuasively
made against laws banning same-sex marriages or laws criminalizing only
same-sex sodomy,190 and it applies with equal force when the law provides
more favorable treatment to same-sex couples than it does to opposite-sex
couples. Moreover, even setting their theory to one side, it is clear that the
cases refusing to classify same-sex conduct as adultery are based on
gender-discriminatory regimes, as they rely exclusively on arguments
grounded in the common law theory of adultery that punished only the
wife's acts of adultery while leaving those of the husband unpunished.
Second, to punish opposite-sex adultery while leaving same-sex
adultery unpunished is a form of sexual orientation discrimination, with
heterosexuals being the class that is discriminated against. Having struck
down laws banning same-sex marriage in decisions holding that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to heightened
scrutiny under state analogues to the Equal Protection Clause,' 9 1 courts in
such states can hardly let the discrimination stand when it is directed in the
opposite direction.
Third, it is hardly clear what the "pro-gay rights" position is in this
context. While one might be tempted to say that failing to punish the gay
offender is the pro-gay rights approach, one must not forget that the victim
in these situations is also gay. In other words, in the context of marriage,
every responsibility for one partner constitutes a corresponding right for
the other.
190. See Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 149-51, 158-60 (1988); Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197,
199-205 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 187, 230-31 (1988).
191. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82 (Conn. 2008);
Vamrnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 884-85, 906 (Iowa 2009).
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Fourth, to not punish same-sex adulterous behavior while
simultaneously punishing opposite-sex adulterous behavior is to demean
the value of same-sex relationships. Just as, in the words of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, it "demeans the lives of homosexual persons" to have
decisions such as Bowers on the books that make private, consensual sex
between two people of the same sex a criminal act,' 92 and just as denyin
same-sex couples the ability to marry devalues the lives of gay people,'
so too does it demean the lives of gay people to fail to equally protect their
formal, legal relationships from the harms associated with adulterous
conduct. Furthermore, it demeans the value of same-sex relationships by
perpetuating antiquated, negative stereotypes about gay people by
associating the virtue of fidelity with heterosexuality by enforcing a
faithfulness norm against them while leaving same-sex relationships
unregulated and thus tacitly enforcing or endorsing a norm of promiscuity.
Finally, the risks associated with punishing same-sex adulterous
conduct via a different route are extremely harmful to the cause of gay
equality. Writing shortly after Lawrence was decided and with reference to
the New Hampshire Supreme Court decision examined above, Professor
Mary Ann Case wondered whether legislatures, eager to still punish
homosexual conduct, might amend their adultery statutes and fault-based
divorce schemes to make clear that such conduct is included within
them. 194 While the risk of selective enforcement of criminal laws is always
of upmost concern in the gay community-given the history of selective
enforcement of sodomy laws-the truth is that there are significant risks
associated with not amending or appropriately interpreting the term
"adultery."
For, as demonstrated above, sodomy laws are still on the books and can
still validly be enforced in contexts distinguishable from Lawrence itself,
and some fault-based divorce schemes still separately identify sodomy and
homosexuality as forms of fault. Yet, to allow same-sex adultery to be
punished through these alternative routes is to confuse the issues in a
dangerous way, punishing same-sex adultery not because adultery is wrong
but instead because same-sex conduct or homosexuality itself is wrong.
(Consider, in this regard, the highly publicized discharge of Margaret Witt
192. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
193. See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1181 (1999).
194. Case, supra note 22, at 141 ("Because of these negative externalities of adultery, the more
interesting question about its future is not whether it will be unconstitutional to criminalize it after
Lawrence (most likely not, since, as noted, it can cause harm to an institution the law protects), but
rather, will legislatures, eager to strengthen traditional marriage and perhaps still interested in
penalizing, condemning, or discouraging those engaged in homosexual conduct, now move to
amend their adultery statutes so as to include within its definition homosexual conduct by a married
person, either for purposes of the criminal law or related purposes, such as assessing fault in divorce
or allowing actions for alienation of affection.").
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from the U.S. Air Force:195 Ms. Witt's discharge occurred after she had an
affair with a married woman, but she was discharged for her homosexual
conduct pursuant to the military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy instead of
for her adulterous conduct.)196 True enough, the sodomy laws will remain
invalid as applied in the contexts constitutionally protected by Lawrence.
However, the implicit message sent by enforcement of a sodomy law (or
enforcement of the military's ban on service by openly gay persons) on the
one hand is very different indeed than enforcement of adultery laws on the
other.
The day may ultimately come when adultery laws and other statutory
schemes that take adultery into account are either repealed or struck down
as unconstitutional. For now, however, they are a part of the package of
rights and responsibilities that gays and lesbians have fought so hard for in
marriage litigation. To accept the benefits of marriage without the
corresponding responsibilities associated with it is to accept the sorts of
"special rights" that gays and lesbians are so often unfairly accused of
doing when otherwise seeking equal treatment under the law.
195. Witt v. Dep't of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 809-10 (9th Cir. 2008).
196. See Witt v. U.S. Dep't. of Air Force, No. 06-5195RBL, 2010 WL 3732189, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 24, 2010).
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